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ARGUMENT
I.

THE MEDIATION AGREEMENT IS NOT A FINAL,
ENFORCEABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT RESOLVED
THE LITIGATION.
This Court should reverse the trial court· s order, which wrongfully enforces

the Mediation Agreement as a final, enforceable settlement agreement. The
express language of the Mediation Agreement makes any final settlement "subject

to" the future drafting of a mutually acceptable final settlement agreement
containing the terms of the Mediation Agreement and a to-be-negotiated nondisparagement clause, as well as new GYN and Spearhead agreements. And
dismissal of the lawsuit is not to occur until after execution of those final
agreements. Under these circumstances, essential, material terms of a final
settlement are lacking, or at minimum, the Mediation Agreement is insufficiently
definite as a matter of la\v. The trial cou1t's conclusions to the contrary vvere
incorrect.

A Correctness Standard of Review Applies to This Appeal.
Based on the specific circumstances of this case, the Court should apply a

correctness standard in rev ievving this appeal. l n John Deere Co. "· A & H
Equipment. Inc.~ this Court held that ~-whether a contract exists between parties is a

question

or lmv \vhich ,ve revii:~,v for correctness.:,

876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct.

App. 1994 ): see olso Carter,'. Sorens011, 2004 L:T 33, ~f 6, 90 P.3d 617 ('"\Ve

determine the existence of a contract such as an option agreement, by resorting to
principles of law; therefore, we grant no deference to the trial court that originally
decided the matter."); Herrn Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Whether a contract exists between pa1iies is a question of
law; therefore, we review the trial court's conclusion oflaw under a correction of
error standard."). As here, that case involved a trial court's decision "to enforce [a]
settlement agreement" and the trial court's conclusion that the parties "had a
meeting of the minds." John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 883. Considering these
specific issues, the court identified that a correctness standard is the appropriate
standard of review. Id. ("As to these issues, whether a contract exists between
parties is a question of law which we review for correctness.") (emphasis
supplied). Because the same issues that were dealt with in John Deere Co. are
being reviewed in this case, the correctness standard should be applied.
Patterson argues ,vithout explanation or analysis that the Court should apply
a clear error standard, citing only LD 111,. LLC v. BBRD! LLC, but in that case,
where there was admissible factual material regarding the formation of a settlement
agreement outside of the settlement agreement itselt~ the Court properly held that
·"[t]he [underlying] issue of whether a contract exists may present both questions
of law and fact, depending on the nature of the claims raised.~' 2009 UT App 301,

ilil 3--5, 13,221 P.3d 867 (quoting Cal Wadnvorth Constr. v. Cit_v (!{St. George,

')

865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Under the particular circumstances of
that case, factual findings were appropriate on the material outside of the written
agreement. See id.
The instant case is different. Here, there is no admissible record evidence
regarding the circumstances of any agreement outside of the four comers of the
Mediation Agreement itself. As acknowledged by both parties, the Mediation
Agreement was negotiated and executed entirely within the confidential, closed
context of a mediation. Under the Utah Uniform Mediation Act, "a mediation
communication is privileged ... and is not subject to discovery or admissible in
evidence.', Utah Code § 78B-l 0-104( 1). Mediation communication is defined as
"conduct or a statement~ whether oral, in a record, verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs
during mediation." Utah Code § 78B-l 0-102(2). The only matter from a
mediation that can be disclosed and admitted is a mediation communication "that
is in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all patties to the agreement.'~
Utah Code § 78B-10-106( l )(a). Accordingly, in this case, the only admissible
record evidence that can be used to determine whether the parties had a meeting of
the minds is \vhat is found in the four corners of the Mediation Agreement.

Importantly., under Utah lavv~ in determining whether the parties created an
enforceable contract, courts are required to "'first 'look to the writing itself to

ascertain the parties' intentions_ . ,~ Lebrecht v. Deep Blue Pools and Spas Inc.~

...,
_)

2016 UT App 110, ~ 14, -

P .3d -

( citations omitted); see also John Call Eng 'g,

Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987) C[T]he intentions of
the parties to a contract are controlling, and generally those intentions will be
found in the instrument itself.") ( emphasis supplied); LDS Hosp. v. Capitol L{fe

Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) ("The interpretation of a written contract
may be a question of law determined by the words in the agreement. In this
regard, we recently stated that a cardinal rule in construing the contract is to give
effect to the intentions of the parties and, if possible, these intentions should be
gleaned from examination of the text of the contract itself."). Where an appellate
court is "in as good a position as the trial court" to examine the settlement
agreement and any admissible evidence that was available to the trial court, it
"owe[s] the trial comi no deference." Lebrecht, 2016 UT App 110 at ,r 10.
Here, the only admissible and relevant evidence that can be considered to
determine whether the pa1iies had a meeting of the minds as to all essential terms
of the agreement is the language of the Mediation Agreement itself. With no
extrinsic evidence, the Comi is in as good of a position as the trial court to interpret
the Mediation Agreement and the Court can do so as a matter of law.
Patterson incorrectly argues that the Knights have failed to marshal the
evidence without explaining what "findings" the trial court made that require
evidence marshaling. Where there was no extrinsic evidence for the trial court to
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consider, there was no need below to present evidence and make findings. Indeed,
the trial court based its decision on the terms of the rvlediation Agreement [Add. A
at 0552-56], and properly held that it could not consider any other facts such as the
patties' discussions during mediation because such evidence is privileged. [Id. at

0555-56.] Accordingly, there was no evidentiary hearing, no extrinsic evidence,
and no factual finding, and on appeal, nothing to marshal. 1
Neve1theless, even if marshaling was required, the Knights have sufficiently
marshaled evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has "'repudiate[ d] the default notion
of marshaling sometimes put forward in our cases and reaffirm[ ed] the traditional
principle of marshaling as a natural extension of an appellant's burden of
persuasion." 1Vielsen, 2014 UT 10 at~ 41. The focus of the com1 is aon the merits,
not on some arguable deficiency in the appellant's duty of marshaling." Id. at iI 42.
Thus, an appellant is not required to play '"devil's advocate' and ... present[]
·every scrap of competent evidence· in a ·comprehensive and fastidious order.'''
·-.:J

Id at~ 43 (citations omitted). Because the Knights attached the Mediation

Agreement in its entirety as an addendum to their opening brief, the marshaling
requirement is satisfied. This ,vas the sole relevant, admissible evidence below.

1

Marshaling is ··part oCthe overall burden n1.:cessary Lo meet the clear error
standard of revie\:v on appeal.~- Stare v. Nielsen. 2014 CT l 0, ,r 36, 326 P.3d 645.
5

Patterson seemingly tries to argue that the allegations of his complaint and

representations of his counsel at oral argument constitute evidence that the trial
court could have considered in making its decision below. Patterson Brief at 1820, 24-25. However, neither allegations nor representations of counsel constitute
evidence. See, e.g., Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404,274 P. 856,860 (1929)
(finding that "allegations are not even evidence, much less proof of the fact");

Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991) (upholding trial
court's jury instruction that stated, among other things, that "allegations are not
evidence, but are merely the extent of the plaintiff's claims, and must not be
considered by you as evidence in the case"); Wilson v. IHC Hasps., Inc., 2012 UT
43, ,r 141 n.9, 289 P.3d 369 ("Attorney statements are not generally admissible as
evidence.") (citations omitted); Butterfield on Beha(lofButterfield v. Okubo, 790
P .2d 94, 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev 'don other grounds sub nom. Butte,jield v.

Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992) ("The representations of counsel, though entirely
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence .... "). Since the
Mediation Agreement is the only evidence that can be considered by the Court, the
correctness standard is the appropriate standard of review for this appeal.

t:...

V

B.

The Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded That the Parties Reached
a Meeting of the Minds on the Essential Terms of a Binding
Settlement Agreement.

The Cou11 should overturn the trial cou11' s decision to enforce the lVlediation
Agreement as a binding settlement agreement because, as a matter of law, the
patties never reached a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of an
agreement. The "'"burden of proof for showing the parties' mutual assent as to all
material terms and conditions is on the party claiming there is a contract."' Bybee
v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ,i 8, 189 P.3d 40 (quoting Cal Wadsworth Const,,·., 898

P.2d at 13 76 ); see also Sack/er v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah 1995) (""[T]he
plaintiff has the burden of showing that an offer and acceptance were more
probable than not.''). The pa11ies agree that an enforceable settlement agreement
requires a meeting of the minds on the essential or material terms, and terms that
are sufficiently definite to be enforced. Patterson Brief at 17 (citing LD Ill, 2009
UT App 301 at

,r 14 ); Knights Brief at 9-10.

It is true that ··[\v]hether or not [a

term is] essential to the contract requires an examination of the entire agreement
and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into." Cessna Fin.
'-'

Corp. ,·. 1\1eyer, 575 P.2d I 048~ I 050 (Utah 1978); Patterson Brief at 17: Knights

Brief at 12. But as shown above. in the present case the '"circumstances'· of the
agreement were a privileged mediation, leaving the Court only the four corners of
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the written Mediation Agreement to determine whether all essential terms have
been agreed upon.
Moreover, as addressed in the Knights' brief but ignored by Patterson, an
agreement, including a settlement agreement, is not binding if the parties intended
to leave an essential term open for future consideration or further negotiation. See
Knights Brief at 10-12 (citing Prince, Yeates & Ge/dzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26,
~

17, 94 P.3d 179; 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, ,I 7, 127

P.3d 1241 ). Such an agreement is refeITed to as an "agreement to agree" and is
"generally unenforceable." Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah
1979).
The terms of the agreement "are to be interpreted in accordance with their
usually accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions." Nielsen v. 0 'Reiflv,
848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah I992). In this examination, ~"the ordinary and usual
meaning of the words used is given effect,' \-vhich 'ordinary meaning ... is often
best determined through standard, non-legal dictionaries."' S. Ridge Homeowners'
Ass 'n v. Brown, 2010 UT App 23,

~

1,226 P.3d 758 (quoting Warburton v.

Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
Utah courts are to "·'look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids

rendering any provision meaningless.'" Id. (citations omitted).

8

As detailed extensively below·, by examining the entire rvtediation
Agreement, and attempting to harmonize its provisions, the Court should conclude
that the patties did not have a meeting of the minds regarding the essential terms of

a new agreement with Spearhead, a new agreement with GYN, and a mutually
acceptable settlement agreement containing a to-be-negotiated mutual nondisparagement clause. Based on those missing material terms, there was no
enforceable agreement.
1.

The References to the Spearhead Agree111ent, Gl'N
Agreement, a11d 1l1utua/ Non-Disparage1ne11t Clause
Indicate That lVo Contract J,Jlas Formed.

Reversal is warranted because the language of the IVlediation Agreement,
when read as a whole in an effmt to harmonize its provisions, shows that the
patties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on all essential terms of a binding
settlement agreement. For example, paragraph 8 of the IVIediation Agreement
states that the I'Vlediation Agreement is ~-[ s ]ubject to [d]rafting

111 utual ly

accept.able

settlement agreement w/ above provisions and mutual non-disparagement and
NE\V GYN & Spearhead [aJgreernents.'' [Add. Bat il 8.] According to the
l'vlerriam- \Vebster dictionary, ··subject to'' means "dependent on something dsc to
happen or be true.~· Dejinition c~( ··sul?iect to.'' rnerriam-webster.com,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subject%20to (last visited July 21,
~~O

16 ). \\/here t.he r\,1ediation Agreement. '"depends on-~ the draning of a mutual I),

9

acceptable settlement agreement that includes a mutual non-disparagement clause
and new GYN and Spearhead agreements, there can be no dispute that these terms
were essential to any settlement agreement. But due to the fact that the terms of
the mutual non-disparagement clause and GYN and Spearhead agreements are
missing from the Mediation Agreement, there is nothing more than an agreement
to agree, and no meeting of the minds on the essential terms of a contract.
Next, paragraph 9 of the Mediation Agreement provides that "upon
execution of [fJinal settlement documents and new GYN and [n]ev-l Spearhead
[a]grmt. [p]arties will [fJile a [s]tipulated [m]otion and [o]rder to [d]ismiss
litigation w/ prejudice." [Add.Bat 19.] Tellingly, this paragraph's separate
reference to "final settlement documents'' and new G YN and Spearhead
agreements evidences the parties' intent that the new GYN and Spearhead
agreement are not simply an appendage of a settlement agreement as Patterson and
the trial couit seem to suggest. Instead, the negotiation, drafting, and execution of
each document would still be needed to accomplish the overarching purpose of any
settlement agreement, which is to settle and resolve the lawsuit. Without these
documents, the Mediation Agreement is merely an agreement to agree.
Patterson argues that the Mediation Agreement contains all of the essential
terms of the parties' settlement, but then only goes on to analyze the terms of the

10

first seven paragraphs,:2 without attempting to show how the remaining paragraphs
relate to and \Vork ,vith those other terms. Patterson Brief at I 9-20. Patterson's
exercise of reading paragraphs 8 and 9 out of the document is not an examination
of the entire agreement, does not harmonize all of the terms, and does not interpret
the plain language of the entire agreement.

It is insufficient for Patterson to argue that paragraphs 8 and 9 of the
Mediation Agreement were not essential on the premise that settlement agreements
are "enforceable even when the parties expect to put the terms in a more formal
document.'' [Add. A at 0553-54.] This argument falls sho11 for the same reasons
as the trial courf s conclusion that the Mediation Agreement "contemplates ( 1) that
the parties will take the handwritten [Ivlediation] Agreement and formalize it in a
written formac and (2) the pai1ies will amend the existing agreements to include
the provisions set fo11h in the [Mediation] Agreement." [Id. at 5 53.] While true
that the "mutually acceptable settlement agreemenf' ,vould be drafted ''w/ [the I
above provisions'' [Add. B. at

i1 8]. the Mediation Agreement does not explain at

all what terms would be included in the "'NEW GYN & Spearhead [a]greements,'
or the ··mutual non-disparagement'· clause. [Id. at il 8.]

------- - - - 2

As to paragraphs 3 to 7, Patterson only slates that they "'also fit the bill and are
sufficiently definite because they are capable of being enforced.'' Patterson Brief
at 20.
1l

Patterson also cannot resolve the omission in the Mediation Agreement of
the terms of the "NEW GYN & Spearhead [a]greements" and the "mutual nondisparagement" clause. [Id.] Where the Mediation Agreement is silent, Patterson
can only resort to his complaint and the statements of his counsel, neither of which
is evidence that can fill a gap in the Mediation Agreement. Patterson Brief at 22-

23. First, just because "the crux of' Patterson's underlying complaint was his
"claim that the Knights breached the parties' JV Agreement by failing to pay
Patterson his fifty-percent share of the Spearhead commissions" does not mean that
this ,vas the only issue that the paiiies were seeking to resolve during the course of
their mediation negotiations. Patterson Brief at 23. Indeed, it is common for
patiies seeking to settle a lawsuit to, as a part of their settlement, resolve other
issues that were not pled as claims or counterclaims in the lawsuit. As addressed
above, without admissible evidence of the mediation discussions, the parties are
left with the Mediation Agreement itself.
Second, Patterson cannot say that the Mediation Agreement's silence about
the terms of the new Spearhead and GYN agreements evidences that no terms were
required by the parties. This circular argument lacks any evidentiary supp011,
effectively renders meaningless the requirement that there be new Spearhead and
GYN agreements, and only supports a finding that the Mediation Agreement is not

a binding settlement agreement because it fails to specify the terms of the new
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agreements. The finalization of the nevv agreements is a condition of the
Mediation Agreement.
Finally, relying entirely on the statements of his counsel made at oral
argument below, Patterson argues that the Mediation Agreement only required that
the new Spearhead and GYN agreements incorporate the provisions of the
l\1ediation Agreement. Patterson Brief at 23-24 (citing statements of counsel at
oral argument that old and new Spearhead agreements were "virtually identical").
Such statements are not evidence, should not have been relied on by the trial court,
and cannot be relied upon by this Com1. See, e.g., fVilson, 2012 UT 43 at~ 141 n.9
CAttorney statements are not generally admissible as evidence.") (citations
omitted); Butte,:fie!d on Beha((ofButte1:fleld, 790 P.2d at 96 ("The representations
of counsel, though entirely credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence
.... "). Outside of the incorrect statements of Patterson's counsel, which are not
evidence, Patterson has identi tied no evidence to suggest that the ne,v Spearhead
and GYN agreements only incorporated the provisions of the Mediation
Agreement. The Mediation Agreement is simply silent about the new agreements'
terms. Under these circumstances, material terms are missing and the trial court's

ruling otherwise should be reversed.

2.

T/Je Non-Disparage1nept Provision Required by the
1}1/cdiation Agreement Is an Essential Term.

The trial cou1t also erred by failing to find that the provisions of the mutual
non-disparagement provision to be included in the eventual settlement agreement
were essential terms omitted from the Mediation Agreement. As the Knights
demonstrated in their opening brief, it is not unprecedented for a court to hold that
a non-disparagement clause is an essential term of a contract. Knights Brief at 1819 ( citing 1-ligbee v. Senhy Insurance Co., 25 3 F .3d 994 (7th Cir. 200 I). ln
Higbee, the court recognized the non-disparagement clause as an essential term of
the patties' settlement agreement based on an examination of the circumstances of
the negotiations betv..1een the patties, and specifically evidence that one party
"made it clear that she would not settle the case without such a clause." Higbee,
253 F.3d at 998. Because the non-disparagement clause was an essential term to
the parties' settlement agreement and the paities did little more than agree that ''the
settlement agreement would contain a ... non-disparagement clause," the court
held ''too much was left unresolved" to find the existence of a binding settlement
agreement. Id.
Although there is no admissible evidence available to the Court to determine

whether the Knights, like the party in Higbee, made it clear in negotiating the
Mediation Agreement that they would not settle the case without a nondisparagement clause, it is undeniable from the face of the Mediation Agreement
14

that settlement was "'subject to'' or dependent on drafting a mutual nondisparagement clause. [Add. B at~ 8~ Point (I )(B )( 1 ), above.] This language, as in
Higbee, is sufficient to show that the mutual non-disparagement clause \Vas

essential and without its specific terms, which were deferred, the Mediation
Agreement is too indefinite to be enforced.
Patterson mistakenly argues that the Knights cannot raise this issue on
appeal because it was not preserved below. Under Utah law, an issue is preserved
for appeal if it is '"'raised in the trial court such that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on the issue.'~ Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31,

~

26, 158 P.3d

540 (citing Spears v. H'arr, 2002 UT 24, ill L 44 P.3d 742). The Knights did this,
raising below multiple times the argument that the terms of the mutual nondisparagement provision were essential and never agreed upon. 3 Patterson also

3

[363-365 (memorandum opposing Patterson's motion to Ii ft stipulated stay and
to enforce settlement) (providing legal basis for argument and arguing·'[ t]hese
·future negotiations to be had' regarding the Settlement Proposal, a nondisparagement agreement, the Spearhead Agreement and the GYN agreement,
demonstrate that the Settlement Proposal is just that-a proposal.")]~ [618 (oral
argument) (Counsel for the Knights: "'"\VelL I think it's clean-iCs really wellifs clean. Just-and I think it includes ,vhat the deal is here because \vhat you
reallv see is that it does not have the binding langua2.e in it, and then it goes onclearly at paragraph eight and nine besides not indicating it's binding, indicates at
Paragraph eight and nine subject to drafting mutually agreeable settlement
agreement with above provisions, and mutual non-disparagement, and--I ~m going
to get to this in a minute but most jmportant--a nc\v Got Your Number and
Spearhead agreements. And that language. \vhen you realJy understand what \h/as
going on in this mediation, whaf sin their minds, is the language that totally
.,J

,__,
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.__.

'-

._.

addressed this issue, responding to the arguments raised by the Knights. 4 Where
both parties raised and addressed this issue, it cannot be argued that the trial cowi
lacked an opportunity to rule on the issue.
Patterson also mistakenly argues that the Knights have not presented any
evidence showing that the terms of the mutual non-disparagement provision were
essential to the parties' settlement. Patterson Brief at 2 7. As demonstrated above,
as well as in the Knight's opening brief,5 the evidence showing that the terms of
the mutual non-disparagement provision were essential to the parties' settlement is
the language of the Mediation Agreement itself, which makes the Mediation
Agreement ''subject to" or conditioned on the drafting of a mutual nondisparagement clause. It was not for Patterson or the trial comt to second guess
this language. The parties never reached a meeting of the minds on all of the
essential terms of a binding settlement agreement, which necessitates reversal.

throws out this idea that it's a completed essential terms that are binding in this
agreement.").]
4
[ 441 (''The additional general provisions identified-confidentiality, nondisparagement, right of assignment, exclusivity, allocation of expenses to
Spearhead, non-disclosures, non-competition, non-solicitation, and executive
placement--are not material terms of a settlement.").]
5
Knights Brief at 17.
16

C.

It Would Be Irrational and Impracticable to Enforce the
I\tlediation Agreement as a Binding Settlement Agreement.

The Court should also overturn the trial court's order because it would be
irrational and impracticable to leave the parties with only the Mediation Agreement
as their governing settlement agreement. This result from below simply makes no
logical sense as was alluded to by the trial court. The Mediation Agreement, as
drafted, does not provide a means to accomplish its overarching purpose, which is
to resolve and dismiss the underlying lawsuit.
The trial court plainly acknowledged this problem, warning Patterson at oral
argument: ··I don't know what you are going to do. You may have a resolution
here, but how are you going to enforce [the Mediation Agreement] \vithout a bunch
more Ii tigati on?" [664.] The trial court further asked Patters011, s counse I,
"[A]ren't you creating more problems for your own client if you proceed under the
handwritten agreement? ... I'm almost wondering \vhy you're in here in court
today seeking to enforce this settlement agreement.~~ [668---69.]
Patterson has not and cannot answer these questions, but instead opines,
\Vithout analvsis,
that ··the Mediation AgreemenCs essential terms are sufficientlv.
.
~

definite as to be capable of being enforced because they provide a basis for
determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.~·
Patterson Brief al

:w.

This simply is untrue. The ~"-1ediation Agreement is not
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sufficiently definite to fulfil! its overarching purpose of settling and dismissing the
underlying case.
As the trial coutt made clear, another litigation or mediation will be needed
to resolve the omission of nondisparagement terms, to negotiate and put in place a
new GYN agreement, and to negotiate and procure with Spearhead a new
Spearhead agreement. Dismissal by the trial court was not supposed to occur until
the parties' dispute was fully resolved, as the Mediation Agreement itself says.
[Add. B at~ 9.] By dismissing the case, the trial court has only set the parties up
for further litigation. Until the essential missing terms are supplied, the status quo
of the Mediation Agreement will be ineffective to meet its purpose of resolving the
dispute between the parties. Under these circumstances, enforcing the Mediation
Agreement as a final, binding settlement agreement would be irrational and
impracticable. Reversal is therefore appropriate.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Knights respectfully request that the Court
reverse the trial cowt's legal conclusion that the Mediation Agreement-standing
alone-was a binding and enforceable settlement agreement, and in turn reverse
the trial coutt's ruling dismissing this action with prejudice, and remand the case
for further proceedings.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2016.
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